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Article 7

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FEDERAL JURISDICTION ACCORDING TO
PROFESSOR FRANKFURTER

EVAN TSEN LEE*
The birth of the modern course in “Federal Courts” or “Federal
Jurisdiction” is usually traced to the publication in 1953 of Henry M. Hart and
Herbert Wechsler’s The Federal Courts and the Federal System.1 I do not
wish to depreciate the magisterial accomplishment of that volume in any way.
In this review, however, I examine a casebook that was the intellectual
forebear of Hart and Wechsler: Felix Frankfurter and Wilber G. Katz,2 Cases
and Other Authorities on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure (1931). I hope
this look back will provide an interesting perspective on the future of the
course.
I
Felix Frankfurter was born in Vienna in 1882, the third of six children.3
His father, Leopold, was a rather ineffectual man, a romantic and connoisseur
of the finer things in life, but a guileless and slightly indolent businessman who
could barely keep the family financially afloat in the rough economic waters of
late nineteenth century Vienna.4 His mother Emma was stouter and more
practical, pushing the boys toward education, directing them away from their
ne’er-do-well father5 and toward their Uncle Solomon, a highly accomplished

* Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. A portion of this essay was
taken from my forthcoming book, tentatively titled, THE STORY OF STANDING: THE LIFE AND
TIMES OF JUDICIAL RESTRAINT IN AMERICA (Oxford University Press).
1. HENRY M. HART, JR. & HERBERT WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (1st ed. 1953).
2. In 1931 Wilber Katz had just started a long career on the faculty of the University of
Chicago Law School, where he would eventually serve as Dean. Professor Katz Retires, THE
GARGOYLE: ALUMNI BULLETIN OF THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN LAW SCHOOL, Spring 1970,
at v. He received his LL.B. and S.J.D. degrees from Harvard. Id. His fields of expertise were
corporations and church-state relations. See id.
3. MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND HIS TIMES: THE REFORM YEARS 7, 8
(1982).
4. See id. at 8.
5. Id. at 12.
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scholar who was appointed director of the state library.6 Young Felix
particularly admired that Solomon had become “a spokesman for Jewish
interests in the city and a shtadlan (backstairs petitioner) with the gentile
power structure.”7 In 1894, Emma reluctantly packed up the children and
followed Leopold to New York, where he sought to start afresh.8
The Frankfurters settled on the predominantly Jewish Lower East Side.9 In
his comprehensive biography of Frankfurter’s pre-Court years, Michael Parrish
documents how the Frankfurters “settled initially on Seventh Street, near
Tompkins Square and Cooper Union, in the heavily German-speaking
neighborhood where the sober residents voted Republican, admired their
wealthy coreligionists—the Seligmans, Warburgs, and Strauses—and hoped to
maintain a comfortable distance from the boisterous, Yiddish-speaking masses
on Henry and Cherry Streets.”10 The German Jews on the Lower East Side
were attracted to gentility, which carried with it a certain social conservatism
and respect for pedigreed institutions and practices; the Eastern European Jews
were generally poorer, more ideological, more political, more devout, and
often more radical.11 Young Felix adopted the values of the German Jewish
community pretty much down the line, with one glaring exception—like his
Uncle Solomon, he loved politics.12
Though he struggled to understand the devoutness of the Eastern
Europeans—to his mother’s eternal consternation, Felix had inherited his
father’s agnosticism—he found the Eastern Europeans intellectually
fascinating.13 At City College, Frankfurter had his first real exposure to these
idealistic and bohemian thinkers, whose “conversations often turned to
anarchism, revolution, Emma Goldman, dialectical materialism, and free
love.”14 This was a far cry from the German-Jewish students whose company
he usually kept, immersed in their quest for respectability and personal
achievement.15 Frankfurter could see the virtues and vices on both sides, and
throughout his career he sought to marry the passion for justice and social
change with a profound respect for history and institutions. It eventually led
him to forsake the dreamier professions of journalist or poet in favor of
becoming a reform-minded lawyer.16

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 9, 12.
Id. at 9.
PARRISH, supra note 3, at 9.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 11, 15.
Id. at 13.
PARRISH, supra note 3, at 15–16.
Id. at 15.
Id.
Id. at 16.
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First, however, there was the matter of legal training. After two brief stints
in night classes at local schools, which he found dull, Frankfurter enrolled at
Harvard Law School in the fall of 1902.17 There, “[i]n high-ceilinged Austin
Hall, . . . the waistcoated doyens of the legal profession—James Barr Ames,
Samuel Williston, John Chipman Gray, Joseph Doddridge Brannan, and
Joseph Henry Beale—attempted to make gentlemen and lawyers out of the
scions of the Anglo-Saxon establishment and a handful of immigrants.”18
Among these faculty members, Gray was a strong influence.19 He hired
Frankfurter as a research assistant.20 Frankfurter undoubtedly read Gray’s The
Nature and Sources of the Law,21 which rejected the jurisprudence of natural
rights “in favor of a pragmatic interpretation of the origin of legal rules that
located them in the shifting configurations of social life and the varying
responses of judges to these changing circumstances.”22 Like his friend
Holmes, Gray had breathed the deep skepticism that led both of them to scorn
Langdell’s orthodoxy and Brewer’s and Sutherland’s views of natural rights.23
Frankfurter would develop a habit of personal adulation for and loyalty to
certain figures (Holmes, Brandeis, and Franklin Roosevelt), but his absorption
of the ideas of James Bradley Thayer cannot be attributed to a personal
relationship between the two. Thayer died the year Frankfurter got to
Harvard.24 Yet, according to Parrish, “Thayer had a profound influence upon
Frankfurter, who read [his paper] ‘The Origin and Scope of the American
Doctrine of Constitutional Law’ so many times that he could recite whole
passages from memory.”25 Thayer’s rule of “clear error” became a cornerstone
of Frankfurter’s professional indoctrination.26 He held this belief uncritically,
as a first principle of American constitutionalism, in need of no justification.
“Above all,” wrote Parrish, “he wished to promote the ideal of judicial restraint
in the tradition of Thayer and Holmes. Judges, he believed, should not
substitute their own policy choices for those of the popular branches.”27
It was not only this abstract commitment to judicial restraint that drove
Frankfurter. There was a strong instrumental motivation as well: as a

17. Id.
18. PARRISH, supra note 3, at 16–17.
19. Id. at 20.
20. Id. at 19.
21. JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW (Roland Gray ed., 2d
ed. 1931).
22. PARRISH, supra note 3, at 20.
23. Id. at 17, 20.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 21.
26. See, e.g., Felix Frankfurter, A Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1002,
1007–08 (1923).
27. PARRISH, supra note 3, at 65.
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consistent advocate of reform, he understood that it was courts, and federal
courts in particular, that stood in the way.28 Although Frankfurter had long
been critical of the use of the diversity jurisdiction and substantive due process
to foil progressive reform legislation, it was the 1923 decision of Adkins v.
Children’s Hospital29 that really stuck in his craw.30 The hospital challenged
the District of Columbia’s minimum wage law for women, alleging that it
violated the principle of liberty of contract as enunciated in the substantive due
process decisions. Frankfurter defended the statute before the Supreme
Court.31 In the wake of cases like Muller v. Oregon,32 McLean v. Arkansas,33
and Bunting v. Oregon34 (which he had argued successfully), Frankfurter was
confident that the tide against wage and hour legislation had turned for good.35
But Justice Sutherland, quoting wholesale from Lochner v. New York,36
distinguished the wage law sub judice from the hours legislation in Muller and
Bunting.37 (Even Taft dissented, though he could not bring himself to join
Holmes’s characteristically blunt opinion.
Brandeis recused himself.)
Stunned, Frankfurter came to the conclusion that the Court had to be forcibly
removed from the business of reviewing such legislation. “The whole thing we
thought gained in 1912 is now thrown overboard and we are just where we
were” he wrote to Learned Hand.38 “I confess I did not expect it again.”39
Shortly thereafter, in the pages of The New Republic, he advocated the repeal
of the Due Process Clause.40
Frankfurter’s zeal for judicial restraint grew out of the combination of deep
professional indoctrination and longstanding political frustration. As Parrish
summed it up, Frankfurter believed that the Constitution “permitted vigorous,
effective government and social experimentation.”41 He wanted to give the
legislature more latitude than even Holmes or Brandeis did.42 He disapproved
of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,43 in which Holmes’s majority opinion
struck down a statute aimed at protecting dwellings from improvident mining
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 21–22.
261 U.S. 525 (1923).
PARRISH, supra note 3, at 165.
Id.
208 U.S. 412 (1908).
211 U.S. 539 (1909).
243 U.S. 426 (1917).
See PARRISH, supra note 3, at 165.
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 548–54 (1923).
PARRISH, supra note 3, at 165.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 167.
Id. at 166.
260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922).
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activity. And he criticized Wolff Packing Co. v. Court of Industrial
Relations,44 which struck down a Kansas scheme that authorized compulsory
arbitration and price-fixing. Holmes and Brandeis had gone along with that
one.45 Frankfurter wrote: “Thus fails another social experiment . . . not
because it has been tried and found wanting, but because it has been tried and
found unconstitutional.”46 It was this almost unremittingly negative attitude
toward judicial review that Frankfurter took into his Federal Jurisdiction
casebook.
II
Cases and Other Authorities on Federal Jurisdiction and Procedure47 was
not just another book treating federal practice as a set of purely technical
requirements, viewed entirely from the standpoint of the lawyer trying to
negotiate the procedural labyrinth on behalf of his client. Instead, it viewed the
subject from the standpoint of a statesman or social engineer, prodding the
reader to think about how the federal courts could best contribute to the
advancement of the polity. The book’s introduction is worth recounting at
some length:
[T]he historic experience subsumed under the phrase “federal jurisdiction and
procedure” is not merely an account of the technical regulation of the business
of administering law through the courts. The particular system of courts with
which we are concerned, unlike other courts, serves a special political purpose.
The federal judiciary is one of the most powerful means for achieving the
adjustments upon which the success of a federated nation rests. Federal
jurisdiction is thus an important part of the public law of the United States.
That the interaction between the political power of states and central
government is conveyed, as it often is, through nice questions of judicial
competence and procedure only adds zest to the exploration of such issues, and
for their solution demands the statesman’s gift of imagination as well as the
48
disciplined training of the lawyer.

In a sense, Frankfurter and Katz found a litigant-centered course on federal
practice and turned it into a course on the federal judicial role in American
political structure, viewed from an Olympian systemic perspective. Of course,
this is too grandiose a statement; it is hard to see how venue, for example,
affects political structure. It is nonetheless true that the editors passed over
several important federal jurisdictional specialties—admiralty, bankruptcy,

44.
45.
46.
47.

262 U.S. 522, 544 (1923).
PARRISH, supra note 3, at 167.
Id.
FELIX FRANKFURTER & WILBER G. KATZ, CASES AND OTHER AUTHORITIES ON
FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (1931).
48. Id. at vi–vii.
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federal criminal law, Indian land litigation, patents—because they were too
“specialized,” and as such, lay at the periphery of the structural dynamic.49 On
the other hand, review of decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands merited inclusion, as Frankfurter’s experience in Teddy Roosevelt’s
War Department convinced him of the topic’s political importance.50
Of the casebook’s 732 pages (not including tables and appendices), the
first 125 are devoted to a chapter entitled “Constitutional Limits of the Judicial
Power—‘Case or Controversy.’” The chapter begins with the prohibition on
advisory opinions (Hayburn’s Case51 and Gordon v. United States52), then
moves to the question of what matters were presented in a sufficiently judicial
form for adjudication (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson,53 Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,54 Muskrat v. United States,55 and the
“Correspondence of the Justices”56). The chapter then discusses “case or
controversy” problems associated with injunctions against the enforcement of
legislation, starting with Ex parte Young57 and directly proceeding to what
today is referred to as “standing” cases (Terrace v. Thompson,58 Frothingham
v. Mellon,59 and Buchanan v. Warley60). The next principal case is Barker
Painting Co. v. Local No. 734, Brotherhood of Painters,61 an obscure twoparagraph Holmes opinion denying that courts have any general warrant to
discourse on matters beyond the immediate controversy. The note cases
following Barker include Lord v. Veazie62 and Chicago & Grand Trunk
Railway Co. v. Wellman63 (no jurisdiction over feigned or collusive cases).

49. Id. at viii n.1.
50. Two decades earlier, Frankfurter served as Legal Adviser to the Bureau of Insular
Affairs in the War Department under his first mentor, Henry Stimson. See PARRISH, supra note
3, at 42. In that capacity, he successfully defended Governor General of the Philippines, W.
Cameron Forbes, from charges that he had illegally detained and deported Chinese aliens from
the islands. Tiaco v. Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 554, 558 (1913). On the other hand, before leaving
the War Department, Frankfurter also “drafted a proposal for expanded Filipino participation in
the islands’ government.” PARRISH, supra note 3, at 45.
51. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
52. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864).
53. 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
54. 279 U.S. 716 (1929).
55. 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
56. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Chief Justice Jay and Associate Justices (July 18,
1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE & PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 1782–1793, at 486, 486–87
(Henry P. Johnston ed., 1891).
57. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
58. 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
59. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
60. 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
61. 281 U.S. 462 (1930).
62. 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850).
63. 143 U.S. 339 (1892).
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The next group of cases relate to “mootness” (Hylton v. United States,64
Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. Interstate Commerce Commission,65 and
United States v. Alaska Steamship Co.66). The case that follows, Fidelity
National Bank v. Swope, 67 questions whether a state court judgment
constitutes a “case or controversy” within the meaning of Article III and
therefore can be reviewed in the U.S. Supreme Court. It is followed by the text
of the then-proposed Federal Declaratory Judgment Act and the Brandeis
opinion casting doubts on its constitutionality (Willing v. Chicago Auditorium
Ass’n68). Then arise two cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court dismisses
appeals because it finds the lower court judgments to be legislative or
administrative in nature rather than judicial (Postum Cereal Co. v. California
Fig Nut Co.69 and Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co.70 ), which
thematically seem better grouped with Swope. The “case or controversy”
chapter ends with what today is referred to as the “political question” doctrine
(Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon71).
As the chapter heading “Case or Controversy” denotes, this first segment
of the book is concerned with outlining the constitutional outer limits of the
circumstances under which Article III courts may adjudicate. Occasionally,
Frankfurter and Katz highlight cases taking a relatively expansive view of such
circumstances,72 but the chapter’s dominant theme is how the circumstances
for proper adjudication are generally limited. The federal judicial machinery
operates only when fed an honest, antagonistic assertion of a vested right, and
even then only in a form familiar to the courts at Westminster at the turn of the
eighteenth century. Frankfurter’s pedagogy reflected a nation’s impatience
with judicial invalidations of Progressive legislation, most prominently local
ordinances regulating working conditions and railroad rate regulations. State
and local lawmakers needed the latitude to combat the disastrous side effects
of industrialization, mechanization, and urbanization. At a time when federal
judges protected vested rights with an almost religious fervor, Progressives like
Frankfurter and Brandeis argued for tight constitutional limits on federal
judicial review.
Chapter Two covers the phenomenon of “legislative courts”—tribunals
created by virtue of Congress’s Article I powers, whose judges lacked life

64. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
65. 219 U.S. 498 (1911).
66. 253 U.S. 113 (1920).
67. 274 U.S. 123, 133–35 (1927).
68. 277 U.S. 274 (1928).
69. 272 U.S. 693 (1927).
70. 261 U.S. 428 (1923).
71. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
72. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917); Pac. Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S.
498 (1911); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
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tenure and salary protection. This chapter primarily consists of two principal
cases, American Insurance Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton73 and Ex parte Bakelite
Corp.,74 which validate territorial courts and the court of claims, respectively,
as exercises of congressional power. The validity of legislative courts was
critical to the Progressive movement and to what was about to become the
New Deal. A strong chief executive could appoint Progressively-minded
commissioners to federal agencies, which would have the first pass at
adjudicating many of the claims arising under their enabling statutes. Even
with some limited form of judicial review, the vested rights jurisprudence of
most federal judges—expressed in large part through the doctrines of liberty of
contract and substantive due process—could be sidestepped.
Section One of Chapter Three covers the doctrines that were eventually
overthrown by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.75 Swift v. Tyson76 was, of
course, a principal bogey, along with its unsubtle modern reaffirmation in
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab and
Transfer Co.77 These decisions gave corporations ample cover from populist
(sometimes redistributionist) state law by invoking diversity jurisdiction. But
Frankfurter gave pride of place in his “Judicial Activism Hall of Shame” to the
opinion by Justice David Brewer delivered for the Court in Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Call Publishing Co.78 As Edward A. Purcell, Jr. wrote in
Brandeis and the Progressive Constitution: Erie, the Judicial Power, and the
Politics of the Federal Courts in Twentieth-Century America:
Western Union was classic Brewer. Asserting the existence of a national
common law, he held that it governed interstate commerce and that it was
independent of both Congress and the states. By recognizing a distinctly
national common law, moreover, he implied that it reached to the limits of
national power and established that the Supreme Court of the United States
79
was its authoritative voice.

Such expansion of federal judicial power, at the cost of Congress and the
states, was the worst of all worlds for advocates of social and industrial
reforms.
Section Two of Chapter Three contains cases that illustrate the reverse of
what eventually became Erie—that is, the proposition that Congress and the

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
279 U.S. 438 (1929).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
276 U.S. 518 (1928).
181 U.S. 92 (1901).
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE
JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY
AMERICA 54–55 (2000).
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federal courts had the power to fashion rules of procedure in cases governed by
state liability rules. Section Three, Chapter Three, covers cases that insist
federal distinctions between law and equity would be applied to diversity cases
in states that abolished such distinctions. A quotation from one such case,
written by Justice Brewer, typifies the idea: “It is well settled that the
jurisdiction of the Federal courts, sitting as courts of equity, is neither enlarged
nor diminished by state legislation.”80 In a number of these cases, this meant
refusing equitable relief for what was deemed nothing more than a legal
claim.81
Chapter Four covers “Jurisdiction of District Courts.” Section One is
devoted to diversity, including the operation of the “assignee clause,”82 the
requirement of complete diversity,83 the reach of “ancillary jurisdiction,”84
corporate citizenship,85 and the anti-collusion clause.86 Section One concludes
with the problem of shareholder derivative suits brought for the purpose of
creating diversity that would not otherwise exist (Hawes v. Oakland87 and City
of Chicago v. Mills88) and a couple of bankruptcy receivership cases.
Section Two, covering federal question jurisdiction, of course includes
Osborn v. Bank of the United States89 (federal question merely need be an
ingredient of cause of action) and Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Mottley90
(well-pleaded complaint rule). Interestingly, it also includes Ex parte Young,91
which held that the question of whether rates were confiscatory under
substantive due process, and the question of whether penalties for violation of
those rates were so draconian as to deny procedural due process, both arose
under federal law. The casebook editors include the Court’s extended
discussion of the Eleventh Amendment question and a relatively full version of
Justice Harlan’s dissent.92 Following Ex parte Young, the editors reprint the
full text of 28 U.S.C. § 380, which prohibited federal injunctions against state
officer enforcement of state statutes except by a three-judge court.93 The
80. Mississippi Mills v. Cohn, 150 U.S. 202, 204 (1893).
81. See, e.g., Thompson v. R.R. Cos., 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 134 (1867); Bennett v. Butterworth,
52 U.S. (11 How.) 669, 676 (1850).
82. See, e.g., Sowell v. Fed. Reserve Bank, 268 U.S. 449 (1925); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 441 (1850).
83. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
84. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
85. Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shepherd, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 227 (1857).
86. Miller & Lux Inc. v. E. Side Canal & Irrigation Co., 211 U.S. 293 (1908).
87. 104 U.S. 450 (1881).
88. 204 U.S. 321 (1907).
89. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 823 (1824).
90. 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908).
91. 209 U.S. 123, 144–45 (1908).
92. FRANKFURTER & KATZ, supra note 47, at 324–29, 331–34.
93. Id. at 334–36.
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editors’ hostility toward Young is evident, as such injunctions formed a major
impediment to the Progressive cause. After three cases dealing with the
procedure of three-judge courts, the editors put Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line
Co.,94 in which the Court reversed federal circuit court decrees enjoining
enforcement of rates on the ground that the plaintiff railroad was required to
make use of an appeal to the state supreme court before petitioning a federal
court of equity. Placement of Prentis in the chapter on federal question
jurisdiction implies that the ruling was jurisdictional, but Justice Holmes cites
“comity and convenience,”95 which suggests that Prentis is instead an early
form of abstention. Section Two concludes with Siler v. Louisville &
Nashville Railroad96 (pendent jurisdiction) and that logical tour de force Home
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. City of Los Angeles97 (act of state official
abusing authority constitutes state action for Fourteenth Amendment purposes,
despite Young’s holding that the official is not the “state” for Eleventh
Amendment purposes). Finally, a footnote on page 388 seems to foreshadow
the abstention doctrine that Frankfurter himself would deliver for the Court
twelve years later in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co.98
With one possible exception, Sections Three through Seven of Chapter
Four cover unremarkable technical ground. Section Three contains seventyseven pages of removal cases, including the fussiest of procedural details about
removal and remand procedure—nothing with any political overtones. Section
Four covers the probate and domestic relations doctrine, and Sections Six and
Seven cover jurisdictional amount and venue, respectively.
Section Five, on federal habeas corpus, rates only two principal cases, but
they are good ones. In re Neagle99 was the Wild West tale of a scorned
couple’s attempt to assassinate Justice Stephen Field. In the summer of 1888,
while riding circuit in California, Justice Field sat in judgment on a case
impugning the validity of the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. David S. Terry.100 The
Terrys took very great exception to the court’s proceeding, accusing Field of

94. 211 U.S. 210, 229–230 (1908).
95. Id. at 229.
96. 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909).
97. 227 U.S. 278, 288–89, 293 (1913).
98. 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941). The footnote stated in part:
Consider to what extent the decision [Gilchrist v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279
U.S. 159 (1929), another case disallowing an injunction where appeal within the state
court system could have been had] was influenced by the fact that the case involved the
construction of difficult statutes and contracts not theretofore passed upon by the state
courts. Cf. Railroad Commission v. Los Angeles Railway Corporation, 280 U.S. 145
(1929).
FRANKFURTER & KATZ, supra note 3, at 388 n.1.
99. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
100. Id. at 42–43.
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having been “bought.”101 After creating such a courtroom commotion that
they were both imprisoned for contempt, the Terrys quite publicly vowed they
would kill Field.102 The next summer, Justice Field returned to California on
official business.103 It was fully expected that the Terrys would attempt to
harm the judge, and one Neagle was assigned to protect him.104 The Terrys
managed to find their way into a railroad dining car in which Justice Field was
having breakfast, and they made their move.105 Neagle foiled the assassination
attempt by shooting David S. Terry dead.106 For reasons not explained in the
opinion, the San Joaquin County Sheriff took custody of Neagle, who
petitioned the federal court for his release.107 Unsurprisingly, the federal
circuit court granted the writ, and the United States Supreme Court, Justice
Field recusing himself, affirmed.108
The other habeas case was Moore v. Dempsey,109 which grew out of an
attack in September 1919 on a black church in Arkansas. A white man was
killed in the ensuing violence, and five black men were arrested and charged
with his murder.110 A lynch mob showed up at the jail, but they were turned
back by a variety of white officials with a promise that the five would be
executed in accordance with the law.111 The ensuing trial was a farce, lasting
only forty-five minutes, with five minutes of jury deliberations before
returning verdicts of first-degree murder.112 Black witnesses were “whipped
and tortured until they would say what was wanted,” Justice Holmes wrote for
the majority.113 “The Court and neighborhood were thronged with an adverse
crowd that threatened the most dangerous consequences to anyone interfering
with the desired result.”114 Holmes held that the district court should not have
dismissed the writ upon demurrer, but instead should have examined the
petitioners’ factual allegations for itself, given that, if the allegations had been
true, they would have rendered “the trial absolutely void.”115

101. Id. at 44–45.
102. Id. at 45–46.
103. See id. at 52.
104. Neagle, 135 U.S. at 52.
105. Id. at 52–53.
106. Id. at 53.
107. Id. at 3–6.
108. Id. at 7, 76. The decision to affirm was not unanimous. Justice Lamar and Chief Justice
Fuller dissented on federalism grounds. See id. at 76–77.
109. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 88–89.
112. Id. at 89.
113. Id.
114. Moore, 261 U.S. 86, 89.
115. Id. at 92.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

790

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 53:779

Chapter Five is titled “Concurrent Jurisdiction of State and Federal
Courts.” It is a surprisingly116 slender thirty-six pages. The chapter leads off
with the Second Employers’ Liability Cases,117 holding that a state court could
properly enforce a federal employer liability statute. Minneapolis & St. Louis
Railroad v. Bombolis118 is next, holding that the mere presence of a federal
statutory cause of action did not mean the Seventh Amendment’s requirement
of jury unanimity applied. The remainder of the chapter’s contents deal with
what is modernly referred to as the “Anti-Injunction Act.”119 Kline v. Burke
Construction Co.120 reiterated the principle that federal courts acting in
personam may not enjoin parallel proceedings in state court. In Lion Bonding
& Surety Co. v. Karatz,121 Justice Brandeis held that if a state court acting in
rem takes possession of the subject property first, it ousts all other courts,
including federal courts, of jurisdiction. After a lengthy opinion in a case
involving counsel misconduct (Harkin v. Brundage122), the chapter closes with
Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor,123 in which the Court held that the suit sub judice
was not truly “one to stay proceedings in a state court.”124
Chapter Six, “Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeal,” is even thinner
than the previous one. There is a Brandeis opinion in a Prohibition Act case
interpreting the final judgment rule (Cogen v. United States125) and a Learned
Hand opinion, Miller v. Maryland Casualty Co.,126 refusing to exercise
appellate review over a jury verdict alleged to have been for a grossly
insufficient amount of damages.
The remainder of the book is devoted to the jurisdiction of the United
States Supreme Court. Chapter Seven, “Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court,” very deliberately leads off with Ex parte McCardle,127 immediately
and dramatically demonstrating congressional control over that appellate
jurisdiction, even when such control was exercised for the most overtly
political of reasons. This principle was most congenial to Frankfurter’s
agenda, which was to enable the insulation of congressional reforms from
conservative federal judges generally, and especially the “Four Horsemen”

116. Surprising, given the incredible range of problems that can arise when two courts have
jurisdiction over the same subject matter.
117. 223 U.S. 1, 59 (1912).
118. 241 U.S. 211, 217, 221–22 (1916).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
120. 260 U.S. 226, 235 (1922).
121. 262 U.S. 77, 88–89 (1923).
122. 276 U.S. 36 (1928).
123. 254 U.S. 175 (1920).
124. Id. at 186.
125. 278 U.S. 221 (1929).
126. 40 F.2d 463, 464 (2d Cir. 1930).
127. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513–14 (1869).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2009]

FEDERAL JURISDICTION ACCORDING TO PROFESSOR FRANKFURTER

791

(McReynolds, Butler, Van Devanter, and Sutherland). Then, after three
opinions on the technical propriety of mandamus, the chapter launches into the
subject of reviewing state court decisions. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee128 is of
course first. It is perhaps significant that Justice Johnson’s concurrence is
reprinted extensively, emphasizing that the Supreme Court has power only
over the people and subject matter involved in the lawsuit, and not over the
state court itself. If Justice Johnson’s separate opinion was not a sufficient
reply to Justice Story’s exertion of federal judicial power in Martin, Murdock
v. City of Memphis129 provided further rejoinder. State courts could be the only
authoritative expositors of state law.
Outside of Martin and Murdock, the most important cases in this section
are Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant,130 King Manufacturing Co. v.
City Council of Augusta,131 Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. Northern Realty
Co.,132 and Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina.133 Each one was an
important platform for Frankfurter’s remonstrance against federal interference
with state economic reforms. In Dahnke-Walker, the majority held that the
case was properly before the Court on a writ of error.134 The state court had
upheld a Kentucky statute placing conditions on out-of-state corporations
doing business in the state. Justice Brandeis (the Kentuckian) dissented,
arguing that the Court had construed the jurisdictional statute far too liberally;
this sort of case could be heard only on writ of certiorari.135 King
Manufacturing involved a municipal ordinance fixing utility rates.136 The
question was whether such ordinance constituted a “state statute” within the
meaning of the jurisdictional statute.137 The majority held that it did, though it
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance on the merits.138 Justices
Brandeis and Holmes dissented, again arguing that such a case could be raised
only on writ of certiorari, and not as a matter of right pursuant to a writ of
error.139 Cuyahoga River Power was dismissed for want of jurisdiction
because of the presence of an independent and adequate state ground.140 The
same occurred with Broad River Power, although the disposition on rehearing

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
257 U.S. 282 (1921).
277 U.S. 100 (1928).
244 U.S. 300 (1917).
281 U.S. 537, aff’d on reh’g, 282 U.S. 187 (1930).
Dahnke-Walker, 257 U.S. 282, 290.
Id. at 293 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
King Mfg. Co. v. City Council, 277 U.S. 100, 101 (1928).
Id. at 102.
Id. at 114–15.
Id. at 116 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
Cuyahoga River Power Co. v. N. Realty Co., 244 U.S. 300, 304 (1917).
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clearly revealed the fault lines on the Court.141 The South Carolina Supreme
Court had ordered the utility to resume operation of a particular line in
Columbia.142 The utility claimed that it would lose money if it were forced to
do so, and that such losses would constitute a deprivation of property without
due process. The Four Horsemen were willing to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction only after examining the merits, which revealed a shaky factual
basis for the constitutional claim.143 Holmes, Brandeis, Stone, and the Chief
Justice stood by the Court’s original dismissal,144 which purportedly had not
inquired into the strength of the merits, but rather only determined that the
judgment was supported by a state ground that was “substantial.”145 In each of
these four cases, there was no mistaking the editors’ normative take.
Businesses challenging reform measures in state court could not be given an
automatic appeal to the Supreme Court. If they could demonstrate a true
likelihood of constitutional violation, the Court could always review by way of
certiorari.
For the sake of completeness, Chapter Eight covers the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court. The first case is Marbury v. Madison.146 To the
uninitiated reader, the case’s significance in American jurisprudence would be
completely unapparent. The opinion was edited down to two and a half pages.
The facts were compressed into a single paragraph. The excerpt ends with
“and it becomes necessary to enquire whether a jurisdiction, so conferred, can
be exercised. . . . The rule must be discharged.”147 The entire discussion of
judicial review is missing. The case is in the book for a single purpose, which
is to illustrate the historic difference between original and appellate
jurisdiction. There is virtually no mention of Marbury anywhere else in the
book.
It is certainly true that the majesty of Marbury’s dicta does not match its
doctrinal reality. “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is” connotes a false exclusivity. It also
suggests a license to discourse on the law at will. But Marbury can just as well
stand for the proposition that constitutional adjudication is warranted only as a
last resort, when a claim of vested rights runs headlong into an otherwise valid
legislative enactment, and there is no other way to resolve the claim. In that

141.
(1930).
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

See Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina (Broad River II), 282 U.S. 187, 192–93
Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina (Broad River I), 281 U.S. 537, 539 (1930).
See Broad River II, 282 U.S. at 192–93.
Id. at 193.
Broad River I, 281 U.S. at 548.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
FRANKFURTER & KATZ, supra note 47, at 692.
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light, Frankfurter’s choice to reduce Marbury to a technical apercu on original
jurisdiction is remarkable.
Only one other case merits mention. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co.148
was a bill in equity filed by the State of Georgia in the United States Supreme
Court, seeking “to enjoin the defendant Copper Companies from discharging
noxious gas from their works in Tennessee” into Georgia airspace. Holmes
spoke for the majority, granting the injunction, and placing states on a quite
different footing (standing?) than private litigants, at least for certain
purposes.149 “The case has been argued largely as if it were one between two
private parties; but it is not,” Holmes wrote.150 “The very elements that would
be relied upon in a suit between fellow-citizens as a ground for equitable relief
are wanting here. The State owns very little of the [affected] territory . . . .
This is a suit by a State for an injury to it in its capacity of quasi-sovereign.”151
Frankfurter could see the structural importance of this case. State sovereignty
did not only mean immunity from suit or from certain types of federal
legislation; it meant special privileges as a plaintiff in a federal court of equity.
Justice Stevens finally seized on this insight exactly a century later in
Massachusetts v. EPA.152
III
To my eye, three things stand out about the Frankfurter and Katz text.
First, it is as much a book about political theory—and only secondarily about
procedure—as a writer could get away with under the circumstances. Most of
the material is about structural protection for the decision-making authority of
Congress, state legislatures, administrative agencies, or state courts, rather than
about what strategic advantages counsel might secure, or about the protection
of the integrity of adjudication for the benefit of litigants. It is hard to imagine
a pedagogic text much more overtly aimed at political theory and less at the
timeless principles of common law adjudication, given the Langdellian
orthodoxy that still largely held sway at Harvard in 1931.153
Second, the book has a readily discernable normative take. In a day when
“notes and questions” were not generally available to rebut the rhetoric of a
148. 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907).
149. See id. at 237.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 549 U.S. 497, 518–19 (2007).
153. It is true that Frankfurter’s course on “Public Utilities” was famously unstructured. “We
were not learning law,” Parrish quotes one student as saying. PARRISH, supra note 3, at 66.
“[T]hat was not our business. We were gaining some measure of understanding of law that both
reflected and shaped a nation’s growth—some understanding of its method and some appreciation
of its content.” Id. Another student devoted a poem to the course: “You learn no law in Public
U/That is its fascination/But Felix gives a point of view/And pleasant conversation.” Id. at 65.
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wrongheaded majority opinion, the editors made their views known by the
selection of certain opinions and by giving full exposition to certain dissents, a
very large number of which were written by Holmes or Brandeis. The book is
fair, in the sense that the big cases cutting against Frankfurter’s view of federal
judicial restraint are generally included (Marbury aside). But one is left with
few doubts about what that view is.
Third, it is clearly a book about the federal judiciary’s place in the
structure of American constitutional government. By volume and emphasis,
the book gives pride of place to separation of powers over federalism, but
whatever order they are given, they are the two structural principles around
which the text coheres.
Each of these three features raises an issue for the future of the Federal
Courts curriculum. Should the course primarily be one about political theory,
or should it primarily be one about federal court procedure? Most of our
students, after all, are not going on to be academics or statesmen. This issue is
a microcosm of a larger dilemma that American law schools have faced for a
long time: practice or theory? At the top schools, at least, theory has won the
day. This is hardly the place to settle such a huge question. Suffice it to say
that treating the Federal Courts course as primarily about American political
theory ought to be no more controversial than teaching criminal law out of the
Model Penal Code or teaching tort law as a vehicle for social control. Of
course, theory and practice are not always mutually exclusive, and surely there
is room in the course for some discussion of procedural rules that have little
structural import. But if there is to be a serious attempt to examine the
structure of American government systematically—even through the eyes of
federal courts—it is hard to see room for such doctrines as venue, court of
appeals jurisdiction, the Tidewater problem, joinder, service of process,
interpleader, interdistrict transfer, and attorney’s fees. Indeed, the complexity
of recent official immunity and federal habeas corpus doctrine threatens to
overshadow their structural importance. And it has been decades since an
Anti-Injunction Act case has had important political overtones.
On the matter of normative take, I see room for individuality. My personal
experience is that most students (at Hastings, at least) are conventionally leftliberal and therefore are sympathetic to criticism of the restrictive justiciability,
procedural due process, and habeas corpus decisions of the Burger, Rehnquist,
and Roberts Courts. They of course expect to be clear on where the agreedupon doctrine ends and criticism begins, and they also want to know the best
arguments supporting these restrictive doctrines. But they tend to grow
impatient with what they correctly perceive as an artificial effort to give
perfectly equal time to the supporting and detracting arguments. At the other
end of the spectrum, a very heavy-handed approach will stifle legitimate
discussion and questions from all but the most intrepid or confrontational
students. One possibility would be to have a meticulously balanced text with a
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clearly opinionated instructor, or vice-versa. In the end, so long as there is full
disclosure, almost any of these approaches can work.
Finally, what of my observation that the Frankfurter and Katz book is
about the place of the federal courts in American constitutional government?
If the course is essentially one about federal judicial power vis-à-vis the other
branches and the states, then perhaps it should be one part of a three-semester
course in Constitutional Law (which might be renamed something like
American Constitutional Government).
Much of the Federal Courts
curriculum is already taught in the “structural” part of Constitutional Law, but
not in much depth. Better to break out those issues directly pertaining to
federal judicial power and put them in a separate semester. But it should be
made clear that federal judicial power is part and parcel of a larger system of
decision-making allocation under the Constitution.
So I conclude this essay with a proposal. Turn the two-semester course in
Constitutional Law into a three-semester course. The first semester would
cover the federal judicial power, including the foundation of judicial review,
subject matter jurisdiction (including supplemental jurisdiction and removal),
the justiciability doctrines, jurisdiction stripping, federal common law, the
Eleventh Amendment, concurrent jurisdiction (featuring abstention), and
independent and adequate state grounds. As suggested above, I would leave
topics like joinder, venue, interpleader, intervention, service of process, and
interdistrict transfer to courses like Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation. (I
would also leave territorial jurisdiction to Civil Procedure, as it has fewer
structural implications than subject matter jurisdiction.) The second semester
would include congressional power, executive power, preemption of state law,
the relationship of the Commerce Clause to federalism, and the relationship of
congressional power to executive power with respect to foreign affairs. The
third semester, of course, would cover individual liberties.154 I would then
eliminate “Federal Courts” as a separate course, leaving such topics as Section
1983 and habeas corpus to a course on civil rights.
I do not claim that this proposal is in some way mandated by the
Frankfurter and Katz text, or that the idea of making the course cohere around
“federal judicial power in constitutional government” is original to Frankfurter
and Katz. Every Federal Courts casebook on the market today displays that
basic emphasis (although many of those books contain topics that are more
procedural than politically structural). I do claim that portraying the federal
judicial power not in isolation, but explicitly as one component of an endlessly
complex and largely fluid system of constitutional government, is the format
that would do the greatest justice to the Frankfurterian idea.

154. I realize my proposal is unlikely to be adopted because it entails pushing “individual
rights” to the second year of law school.
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